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This paper concedes to the view that there is a strong correlation 
between risk, resilience, and sustainability and that governance 
has a bearing on the outcome of each of these processes. This 
suggests that, when the nexus is unstable, there is a greater 
chance that poor governance will be at play. To demonstrate this 
premise using Zimbabwe as a case study, the paper draws on the 
trajectory of crisis from independence till the present day 
highlighting how issues of governance have played a big role 
towards heightening situations of risk, decreasing the resilience of 
the people, subsequently stalling sustainability.  
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Since humans are by nature constrained to observable 
phenomena, they are limited in their ability to see far into the 
future. Thus, modern societies have resorted to the notion of risk 
in order to make sense of their uncertain world (Becker, 2014). In 
so doing, modern societies ascribe risk to anthropogenic 
influences alongside natural variability.1 Essentially, risk is the 
probability of an undesirable outcome combined with the 
magnitude of the losses and gains that it will entail (Douglas, 1992, 
p. 40). Taking this definition into account, vulnerability, then, is 
the propensity to be harmed by undesirable outcomes, while 
resilience is the capacity to cope with and recover quickly from 
these undesirable outcomes. Simply put, resilience is a loose 
antonym for vulnerability (Adger, 2000). This perhaps explains 
why resilience is sometimes referred to as invulnerability in studies 
of psychology. 
 Nonetheless, from a sustainability perspective, risk is said 
to present a safety element which highlights the need to be 
protected from unsafe conditions, or to prevent hazardous 
practices which present unsafe conditions from being carried out 
(Becker, 2014). Being cognizant of the fact that sustainability 
denotes a system’s capacity to endure, coupled with its potential 
for the long term maintenance of well-being, sustainability asserts 
the need to recognize present risk while learning from past risk, 
concurrently planning for future risk (ibid). Through integrating 
this range of temporal scales, sustainability is believed to create 
risk resilient communities.  This is why, Becker (2014) states, we 
need to define risk in relation to some preferred expected 
outcome, as in this way, we endeavour to reduce such risk in order 
to safeguard our development objectives. 
The crucial question, however, is how sustainable societies 
which are risk resilient can be created. This has been a question 
that has been explored by several academic scholars and human 
response agencies since the WCED conference on sustainable 
development in 1987 (see Becker, 2014; Cannon & Müller-Mahn, 
2010; Paton & Johnston, 2001; Walker et al., 2004). Subsequently, 
insofar as it has existed as a development paradigm, the notion of 
sustainability has come under criticism for several shortfalls. First, 
it was criticized for failing to facilitate changes to the global 
political economic structure in order to engender the possibility of 
equality (Redclift, 2005). Second, the notion was criticized for 
being biased in its efforts to maintain only ecological resources 
and economic growth, veiling social equality under an ‘intra and 
intergenerational’ rhetoric (Deutz, 2012). In both instances, 
																																								 																				
1 Rockstrom et al. (2009) make a distinction between the Holocene era (where natural variability was mostly 
responsible for environmental changes) and the Anthropocene era (where anthropogenic activities have taken over 
from natural variability in influencing environmental changes). The scholars also suggest that, humanity may have 
already transgressed its boundaries in terms of interference with Earth-system processes such as climate change, rate 
of biodiversity loss and interference with the nitrogen cycle. 
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sustainability overlooked the underlying patterns of everyday life 
by everyday people, as well as the possibility that some segments 
of society were benefiting more from development than others; 
social aspects received insufficient attention in the sustainability 
discourse. In turn, issues of risk and resilience were not fully 
incorporated into the paradigm. This changed with the rolling out 
of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. The SDGs 
encompass 17 aspirational goals and 169 targets which are 
comprehensive in their purpose to foster economic growth, 
promote environmental protection, end extreme poverty, and fight 
inequality and social injustice. 
To enhance the implementationality of the SDGs, 
governance was appended to the economic, social, and ecological 
dimensions of sustainable development, but only in a functional 
sense. According to the UNDP (2014), over a decade’s worth of 
experience with developmental progress and challenges showed 
that governance should play a stronger role in the post-2015 
development agenda. In essence, there has been a call for a 
fundamental shift in which governance is taken as a core element 
in the achievement of SDGs, bearing in mind that good 
governance enables transformative change which is inclusive and 
people-centered, allowing for the achievement of a range of 
critical development objectives such as boosting community 
resilience and improving risk management. The call to bring 
governance to the fore had been passed as a resolution under the 
Rio+20 Declaration charter, ‘The Future We Want’ earlier on in 
2012. Annex 10 of the charter affirms that member states:  
 
acknowledge that democracy, good governance 
and the rule of law …. are essential for sustainable 
development, including sustained and inclusive 
economic growth, social development, 
environmental protection and the eradication of 
poverty and hunger … [and] reaffirm that, to 
achieve our sustainable development goals, we 
need institutions at all levels that are effective, 
transparent, accountable and democratic.2 
 
While the three dimensions of sustainable development remain 
firm, Figure 1 below encapsulates what the appendage of 










2 See: (UN, 2012a, 2012b) 
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Figure 1: Governance and Sustainability  
Source: Author 
 
In regards to the four pillars cited above, the 
environmental pillar affirms that we do not just live within the 
environment but that the environment constitutes the conditions 
necessary for human existence. Hence we are part of the 
environment in as much as the environment is an integral part of 
our development. Predicated on the irreversible role of 
anthropogenic activities on the environment, the pillar stresses the 
need for humanity to preserve the environment to ensure the 
continuity of humankind. Equally, the economic pillar is focused 
on economic growth that meets human needs while preserving the 
environment for present and future generations. The social pillar 
further raises an awareness of intra- and intergenerational equity, 
thus encompassing the interests of all social groups at present and 
in the future. While governance has been discussed before now, it 
faces the risk of being conflated with good governance 
(accountability, transparency, and enhanced participation), 
overshadowing effective governance (rule of law, capacity 
building, foresight and long-term planning) and equitable 
governance (social justice and fairness) (Biermann et al., 2014). 
Similar to the MDGs, there is an added risk of placing 
disproportionate emphasis on global governance3 and the 
problems of earth system governance under the banner of 
																																								 																				
3 The notion of governance as it is conceived by the UN post-2015 development agenda encompasses more than 
local governance. The UN (2012b) report stresses that recent global trends in food, fuel, and financial crises 
including climate change, migration (and perhaps terrorism) have only proven that the world is very interconnected, 
yet there are global governance deficits to face these global challenges. The report thus called for stronger global 













         Consilience 200 
“planetary stewardship” and the notion that “we are in this 
together” vis-à-vis local governance and local problems (see Gray, 
2015). These are some weakness of the SDGs. 
A critical test for good governance is nonetheless how 
countries respond to risk in the form of extreme and 
unpredictable conditions of natural hazards. For the progress 
Australia has made in its drought policy, the WorldBank and IMF 
(2014) regard it as an example of a country with good governance 
(see p. 132). The Australian drought policy stresses risk 
management and preparedness rather than disaster response. It 
does so through focusing primarily on capacity building so as to 
minimize the need for government intervention (UN/ISDR, 2007, 
p. 18). Through forging proactive rather than reactive solutions to 
drought, risk such as that exemplified by food insecurity and 
famine is prevented, drought resilient societies are generated, and 
sustainability is ensured. The example of Australia ties in with the 
belief that when governance provides an enabling environment for 
sustainability, the end result should be a risk resilient society as 
demonstrated further by the risk model presented below.  
 


















Adapted from: Paton and Johnston (2001) 
 
Accordingly, from the perspective of Rugalema (2000), a 
risk resilient society should be able to deal successfully with risk. 
This implies that when communities encounter shocks, they 
should be able to ‘rebound from the nadir of the disaster’ (p. 538) 
after the hardship has elapsed, where the assets disposed of during 
hardship are recovered and food production is restored.  Thus, the 
implication is that under conditions of bad governance, risk 
increases, resilience decreases, and sustainability stalls whereas 
under conditions of good governance, resilience increases, risk 































Figure 3: Bad Governance                       Figure 4: Good Governance 
       
Source: Author 
 
The fact that governance as a formal institution affects the 
performance of the economy is hardly controversial; nor is the 
fact that the performance of the economy over time reflects the 
institutional policies (North, 1990, p. 3). In fact, as North goes on 
to add, institutions reduce uncertainty by providing structures 
which foster stability. The problem with many governance 
structures however, as Motter (2015) asserts, is that institutional 
processes tend to be dominated by ‘particular interests’ – usually 
political, that overlook the common good, ultimately foiling the 
prospects of achieving inclusive growth  and equitable social 
development. In addition, Motter submits that there is an inherent 
tendency for politicians to sacrifice the long-term perspective that 
sustainable development requires to the short-term pressure of the 
electoral cycle. Lastly, he also posits that in many countries the 
often thin divide between executive and legislative powers remains 
feeble, thus politicians often snub and or supplant the rule of law 
to preserve their own interests versus the common good.  
  The paper will now go on to relay governance issues in 
Zimbabwe, drawing particularly on effects on the poorer citizens, 
in terms of risk, resilience, and sustainability.  The Zimbabwean 
situation is far too complex to be downgraded to a single plot. 
However for the role that governance plays, Cain (2016) highlights 
that under the rule of the incumbent government, “Zimbabweans 
have been subject to gross violations of property rights, including 
state-sponsored expropriation and vandalism, corrupt politicians, 
restrictive business regulations, and an abysmal monetary 
policy”(p. 1). As Cain points out, any one of these factors would 
have been detrimental to any economy, which explains why all of 
them combined have caused untold devastation for a country that 
once beamed as the bread basket of Africa. Cain concludes that 
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the first inaugural address of the former American President 
Ronald Reagan, he thus writes, “Government is not the solution 
to the problem; government is the problem.” 
 
Journeying from Colonialism to Welfarism, Then on 
to Neoliberalism  
 
According to Chikwanha-Dzenga et al. (2001, p. 3), 
Zimbabwe, formerly known as Rhodesia is in large part a prisoner 
of its history, and as Moore (2005, p. 1) concurs, a spectre haunts 
Zimbabwe - a spectre of its brutal colonial past. Despite the native 
government’s rhetoric of redressing colonially inherited 
imbalances, the onset of independence from British colonial rule 
remained blemished by the control of 70% of the best farming 
land by the white minority who made up 1% of the population 
(Zamponi, 2005). The white minority had taken the bulk of the 
prime land and relegated the native majority onto marginal and 
agro-ecologically poor land under the provisions of the Land 
Apportionment Act of 1930 (Kanyenze et al., 2011). The irony of 
this is that the rural areas with an estimated carrying capacity of 
275,000 families had carried a number of about 700,000 families 
by independence in 1980 (Friis-Hansen, 1995). In contrast, at least 
60% of the white farming areas lay idle or underutilized with each 
farm ranging between 500 and 2000 hectares (Harold-Barry, 2004). 
As part of its commitment to redressing the imbalances, the 
incumbent government pledged to resettle at least 162,000 rural 
families within the first five years of independence (Mlambo, 
2014). In line with the Lancaster House Agreement, the British 
government under Thatcher would meet part of the cost for the 
market-based instrument of land reform allowing for land to be 
bought back from the white minority using the fair market value 
(FMV) principle of ‘willing seller willing buyer’ (Chung, 2006). But 
by 1984, only 34,000 families had been resettled (Jacobs, 1991), by 
1989, 52,000 families had been resettled, and by 1990, 71,000 
families had been resettled (Mlambo, 2014). There are claims that 
during this period, the government had misappropriated some of 
the land reclamation funds by securing land for the ruling elite as 
opposed to the landless rural people (Goebel, 2005). This is 
argued to be part of the reason why the British government under 
Blair later went on to cease funding for the resettlement program 
(Chung, 2006). 
Coupled with the slow-paced land redistributions, the 
pitiful living conditions in the rural areas led to rural discontent in 
the 1980s (Mlambo, 2014).  Mlambo reports that during this 
period there were various attempted farm invasions on white 
minority land. The response from the government was to forcibly 
evict the illegal settlers. The government criticized the occupiers as 
unruly elements bent on disrupting the country’s economy (p. 
225). Further, the government told the ‘unruly elements’ that it 
preferred to resettle people who waited patiently rather than those 
who preferred to be squatters (Chiviya, 1982, p. 165). It is no 
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wonder then that the white minority praised the native 
government in the first decade of independence (Mlambo, 2014, p. 
224). Against the pitiful living conditions of rural people, a white 
citizen was cited in Mandaza (1986) as saying, “We have a house, a 
swimming pool, a tennis court, three servants … We’re not living 
in Rhodesia. We’re living in Zimbabwe” (p. 58). 
Taking into consideration their excessive affluence in 
comparison to the native poor, Mumbengegwi (1986) comments 
that the native government had, on top of a dual enclave society, 
also inherited a spoilt white bourgeoisie.4 However, to address the 
colonially inherited imbalances, the Growth with Equity Strategy 
of 1981 paved the way for the improvement of several aspects of 
rural infrastructure (Kadhani, 1986). The government aimed for 
rural electrification, the construction of roads, schools, clinics, 
boreholes, sanitation, and the development of rural growth points 
as business centers (Mangiza & Helmsing, 1991). Paying particular 
attention to the latter, these settlements had been earmarked for 
development through the Integrated Rural Development Plan of 
1978,5 and would serve as the sphere of influence for rural areas 
(Wekwete, 1988).  According to Manyanhaire et al. (2011), the set 
targets were too ambitious, because in the end, not all districts 
managed to get business centers. For those that did, the growth 
points soon became characterized by stagnation and decay. Chirisa 
et al. (2013) essentially classify most growth points as downward 
transition regions. 
The government also initiated health and education 
reforms in both rural and urban areas, the benefits of which were 
mostly felt in the first decade of independence (Muzondidya, 
2008). For example, at independence, rural health care was so bad 
that for every 1000 babies born in Mufakose (a high density 
suburb in Harare) 21 would die before they reached age 1, 
whereas, for every 1000 babies born in Binga (a District in rural 
Zimbabwe) 300 would die before they reached age 1 (Agere, 
1986). Amidst the progress, the amended public health service 
sector could only cater to a small population, mostly in urban 
areas (Chimhowu, 2009), with only about 10% of the rural 
population covered by health care (Kanyenze et al., 2011). Most of 
the rural areas continued to receive health care and treatment from 
churches and missionaries (Chimhowu, 2009).6 While positive 
pricing systems, credit and input supplies, and subsidies were also 
made available to the rural people, and further outcomes of 
development were promised (Raftopoulos & Mlambo, 2008), not 
much development progress ended up being achieved in the rural 
areas (Moyo, 2007). Muzondidya (2008) thus concludes that 
																																								 																				
4 The expression “dual enclave” refers to the coexistence of a ‘sophisticated’ urban economy and ‘rustic’ rural 
economy, including modern versus traditional farming institutions. In essence, the sophisticated economy operates 
as a narrow enclave in a largely traditional society (Mamdani, 1996). 
5 This is a development plan that had been initiated by the colonial government, but was later inherited by the native 
government. 
6 The situation did however improve due to the ‘Health for all by 2000’ Development Plan, but soon deteriorated 
again due to the ongoing economic crisis. 
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government policy did not efficiently renew rural economies or 
revive rural conditions of poverty. 
Notwithstanding this, the first decade after independence 
was marked by other notable socioeconomic improvements. Real 
economic growth had been averaging 4.6% during the 1986-1990 
period (Mazingi & Kamidza, 2011). Yet still, the growth had been 
highly disproportionate as the doors to economic growth had been 
open to only a few (Lopes, 1996) - the elites, who Muzondidya 
(2008) states comprised just 3% of the population  made up of the 
white minority and a small black bourgeoisie.7 On top of being 
highly disproportionate, the growth was been ephemeral in nature. 
After the boom period in the first decade after independence, 
Zimbabwe had succumbed to a bag of mixed fortune, ranging 
from the global economic recession in the 1980s, to weakening 
terms of trade, and high interest rates and oil prices (Mlambo, 
2014; Muzondidya, 2008). The impacts of the State’s welfarist 
policies were also starting to be felt. As Gordon (1984) points out, 
the policies gave rise to heavy investment in welfare expenditure, 
loss of control over fiscal spending, and a repeatedly 
overburdened budget. For instance, the education allocation 
budget between 1982 and 1983 was 22% of the national budget 
(Zvobvo, 1986). As a result, the Bretton Woods institutions with 
their preconditions and concomitants came to the rescue with a 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), widely referred to in 
Zimbabwe as ESAP. SAPs are economic reform packages that 
comprise loans provided by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to Third World countries dealing 
with critical economic hardship (see Wamala, 2012). 
In dire need of economic rescue, the government took to 
the Western neoliberal SAP. This was to lead to the accumulation 
of foreign debt and renewed lease of dependency on the West.8 
Moreover, the SAP saw inter alia, a 40% devaluation of the 
Zimbabwe dollar; price controls, income controls, and labour 
relations controls; the removal of consumer subsidies, producer 
subsidies, educational subsidies (tuition support), healthcare 
subsidies, and transport subsidies; and investment controls, import 
restrictions, and a reduction in welfare spending (Kanyenze et al., 
2011). Then Education Minister Fay Chung also pointed out that:  
 
Tens of thousands of black workers lost their jobs 
… fees were introduced for hospital and clinic 
services: as a result the poorer half of the 
population could no longer enjoy even the most 
rudimentary of medical services … In the 
education sector, I managed as minister to stop 
the introduction of primary school fees in rural 
areas where 70 per cent of the population lived, 
																																								 																				
7 As compared to 4,500 white commercial farmers, as few as 300 natives owned commercial farms at independence 
(Moyo, 1986). 
8 The Zimbabwean government had  inherited  little external debt from the colonial government but its debt started 
accumulating through money borrowed for welfare programs (see Goebel (2005). 
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but they were introduced in the urban areas. 
(Chung, 2006, p. 266) 
 
The outcomes of the SAP contradicted the initial 
government claims that the Zimbabwean SAP was tailored to suit 
native needs (see Maya, 1988). Quite the contrary: where the rich 
would readily respond to structural changes, the poor were 
constrained by a lack of assets and stable incomes and the loss of 
State welfare (Lopes, 1996). In addition to cutbacks in social 
services and a concomitant decline in general welfare, there was 
spiralling inflation (ibid). As such, ESAP was a washout that 
undermined the government’s efforts of the first decade after 
independence. It heightened poverty and created further 
inequalities (Jauch, 2007). The impacts of the ESAP were felt 
deeply by the rural poor because it intensified existing poverty 
issues (Marquette, 1997): user fees for education and health among 
other welfare subsidies had been removed; many jobs had been 
lost due to workforce restructuring; and workers that survived 
retrenchment suffered a real minimum wage decline. The effects 
of ESAP thus increased the residual effects of the historical 
colonial imbalances while at the same time heightening another 
problem of that day and age - the major drought of 1992.9 Overall, 
the early 1990s were dramatic years which I believe constitute a 
crucial chapter in the crafting and coalescence of crises in 
Zimbabwe. With two droughts (one astronomical), the early 1990s 
marked the spiralling of natural risk and risk that is socioeconomic 
and political in nature.  
 
Abandoning Failed Welfarism and Neoliberalism 
for Nationalism 
 
Having flirted with the welfarist policies of nominal 
socialism and the Structural Adjustment policies of neoliberal 
capitalism and failed, the government moved on to an 
authoritarian nationalist ideology leading to more spiralling of risk.  
In the early years of this ideological shift, the ex-liberation war 
heroes’ coercive requests for war gratuities in 1997 were answered 
with financial disbursements amounting to ZWD$50,000 per 
genuine war veteran, and an added ZWD$5,000 lifetime gratuity 
paid monthly. The total cost of this would amount to about 
ZWD$4 billion of the national funds (Chitiyo, 2000). Though 
warranted to an extent, the expenditure was impromptu and 
unbudgeted. Despite this the Reserve Bank of the country printed 
money for the unbudgeted exercise. But before the end of the 
year, the country had plunged into an economic ditch. On 
November 14, 1997, for the first time in Zimbabwean history, the 
currency dropped 72% against the US Dollar. This day is 
remembered in Zimbabwean history as Black Friday. A related 
																																								 																				
9 1992 was a critical year in the history of Zimbabwe, where alongside the socioeconomic effects of the ESAP there 
was a serious drought. Another drought ensued in 1994/95. 
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defining moment in the history of Zimbabwe, is that of the 
despatchment of 3,000 Zimbabwean troops, later amounting to 
11,000,  sent to fight a SADC cause in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo war against Ugandan and Rwandan backed rebels in 1998 
(Mbeki, 2009). This move was again unpremeditated, and in 
following the previous pattern, more bank notes were printed for 
the unbudgeted assignment, resulting in a furthered snowballing 
inflationary situation.  
With a full-blown economic collapse looming over the 
horizon, 1999 saw the birth of a formidable opposition party - the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which was birthed out 
of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The ZCTU 
had been established by the ruling party after independence in 
1981 to represent the black majority workforce. By the late 1990s 
however, the union had become disillusioned by the ruling party’s 
oppressive rule and unresponsive policies. Thus the MDC sought 
to restore the rule of law as well as to enact sound economic 
policies. The birth of the MDC marked the materialization of 
political tensions that had been escalating but held back by civic 
fear. This period was characterized by extensive civic protests that 
were met with active resistance from the armed forces. Surely 
everything in the country had become politicized, including the 
land reform operation. While the market-based instruments of 
land reform had been suspended a few years back, land grievances 
by rural farmers who were now supported by ex-liberation war 
fighters had re-emerged. Faced with the possibility of losing 
electoral votes to the opposition party, the government made the 
populist decision of revisiting the land question. However, because 
the British government had withdrawn the fund to carry out the 
‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ transactions, the only alternative to 
land redistribution was by forceful accumulation or primitive 
accumulation. The year 2000 was therefore characterized by a level 
of political violence not seen since the 1980s. The Third 
Chimurenga War10 had started under the guise of land reform.  
Aside from the targeted white farmers, the land invasions 
affected close to 350,000 native farm laborers (Richardson, 2005), 
who together with their families amounted to over a million 
people (PHR, 2009). This on its own resulted in one of the 
country’s major internal population displacements (IDMC, 2008). 
The land invasions are said to have also dismantled the 
commercial farming sector, which had been a crucial sector, 
contributing 15-19% of the country’s GDP and 60% of its foreign 
exchange revenue (UNECA, 2002). As Mbeki (2009) also points 
out, the commercial farming sector was the key driver in 
generating 60% of raw materials for secondary industries, export 
goods for foreign markets, and fertilizers, pesticides, and other 
agro-equipment for the local market, thus bringing in revenue. 
Therefore the collapse of the commercial farming sector 
																																								 																				
10 The first Chimurenga and Second Chimurenga Wars were anti-colonial rule struggles. The Third Chimurenga War 
was a racialized post-colonial land struggle (see Mlambo, 2014). 
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contributed to food insecurity, mass unemployment, increased 
hyperinflation, political turbulence, and the general weakening of 
the economy. 
Following the chaotic situation and apparent human rights 
violations, economic sanctions were imposed on Zimbabwe by the 
West, first by the EU in 2002 and then America in 2003. The 
Reserve Bank Governor at the time, Dr. Gideon Gono (2006) 
summed up some of the effects of the sanctions as: negative 
impacts on the financial sector; the decline in balance of payment 
support; sustained decline in offshore financing; sustained decline 
in long-term capital; socio-economic repercussions with grave 
development impacts on the health sector, agricultural and rural 
sector, education sector, as well as on investment and growth. 
Despite this very familiar list of consequences broadcasted 
endlessly by the government, the fact remains that the economic 
sanctions were largely targeted (Mlambo, 2014). The Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, which is often 
the reference point for US sanctions, was merely an intervention 
policy set to pressure the government into restoring order in 
Zimbabwe. Section 4 of ZDERA states: 
 
Through economic mismanagement, 
undemocratic practices, and the costly 
deployment of troops to the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, the Government of Zimbabwe has 
rendered itself ineligible to participate in 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and International Monetary Fund 
programs which would otherwise be providing 
substantial resources to assist in the recovery and 
modernization of Zimbabwe’s economy.11 
 
Although ZDERA directs the US representatives at major 
international financial institutions (IFIs) to oppose any new credits 
or debt relief for Zimbabwe, it has had no distinct impact in that 
regard. The IMF (2001) claims that prior to 2000, Zimbabwe had 
defaulted its debt payment plans and was already on those grounds 
ineligible for further funding. As already implied, the actual 
sanctions by the US (i.e. Executive Order 13288) were issued in 
2003 and were targeted at specific individuals12 (Leo & Moss, 
2009). The EU had earlier issued its own sanctions in 2002. 
Similarly, these were smart sanctions aimed at specific government 
officials. Unlike the US, the EU included an arms embargo and a 
curb on certain trade items. Also unlike the US, the EU lifted its 
sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2014.  
In all this, what is constantly discounted by pro-
government commentators is that it is Zimbabwe’s debt burden 
																																								 																				
11 Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 US Public Law 107-99, December 21, 2001. 
12 In this case, US-based assets of 137 members of Zimbabwe’s ruling party were frozen, including 36 companies 
and 28 farms. Also under Executive Order 13288, US entities and persons are prohibited from conducting business 
transactions with these people, and travel sanctions against these people are also in place. 
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(in the range of $7 billion) and not the sanctions that is what 
presently hinders the country from accessing funds from IFIs to 
alleviate the economic strain. Zimbabwe, faced with utmost 
isolation in the 1960s-70s had ironically survived economic 
sanctions under the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 
as Rhodesia. During this isolation period there had been an 
economic boom between 1965 and 1972 evidenced by an annual 
GDP growth of 6% (Sachikonye, 2011), leading to the conclusion 
that: “Rhodesia’s survival, years later, was ipso facto proof, for 
popular opinion as well as for many scholars, that ‘sanctions don’t 
work.” (Minter & Schmidt, 1988, p. 207) 
Embittered by the current sanctions however, the 
government perceived a Western conspiracy against Zimbabwe. 
Determined to challenge the West, the government continued 
with its firm rule, now even more determined to be anti-Western 
imperialist in every sense. However this did not help the economy 
that had already nose-dived into the abyss of doom. At the end of 
2000, per capita incomes were lower than in 1960 (Ndlela, 2009), 
and by 2004, exports were a third of what they had been in 1977 
(Mlambo, 2014). 
By the end of 2005, the loss of the country’s wealth from 
land seizures alone was estimated to be around ZWD$5.3billion. 
This amount is believed to be more than all the foreign aid 
Zimbabwe had received since independence (Richardson, 2013). 
Other studies also claim that the income Zimbabwe lost between 
1999 and 2004 alone exceeds losses suffered by countries like Cote 
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone in their 
individual conflicts (Clemence & Moss, 2005). By now, it seemed 
that everything that could possibly go wrong in Zimbabwe had 
gone wrong, including the weather (Mbeki, 2009). Conditions of 
frequent drought spelled out uncertainty in a country where over 
half the population is rural, needing food aid to supplement its 
yield deficits (Richardson, 2013). 
Due to the escalating interlocking crises, the inflation rate 
hit a record 231 million percent in 2008, making Zimbabwe the 
first country to hyper inflate in the 21st century.13 Richardson 
(2013) states that by 2008, Zimbabwe was 36% poorer than it was 
in 1998. Although things had been progressively souring for 
Zimbabwe between 1996 and 1998, it had remained among some 
of the fastest growing African economies. The remarkable U-turn 
took place between 1999 and 2008 when it became one of the 
fastest shrinking African economies (Kaminski & Ng, 2013). 
Hence with empty shelves in the supermarkets, unprecedented 
fuel shortages, yet another drought, food insecurity, and a 
valueless currency, the year 2008 marked the peak of the 
Zimbabwean crises. The economic crisis also led to water 
shortages, waste accumulation, and sanitation problems. These in 
turn culminated into a countrywide cholera epidemic. The 
epidemic erupted in August 2008 and lasted until June 2009, 
																																								 																				
13 Zimbabwe’s inflation record comes second to Hungary in world history. 
Consilience               Shumba: Risk, Resilience, and Sustaianbility  
	
	
killing at least 4,000 people, with over 100,000 reported cases of 
illness (McSweeny, 2011). It was the worst cholera case in Africa 
in about 15 years (Mukandavire et al., 2011). An unforgettable 
headline from a 2008 newspaper article read: “Zimbabwe’s 
Cholera Victims Ten Times more Likely to Die.”14  
The reasoning behind the headline was that the high 
fatalities were being compounded by other factors such as poverty, 
hunger, HIV/AIDS, and a poor public health system. By 
November 2008, newspaper reports revealed that three out of 
Zimbabwe’s four major public hospitals had shut down, along 
with the country’s only medical school. The fourth major hospital 
was functioning only with two wards, no operating rooms, 
minimal medical staff, and a shortage of basic drugs (Hungwe, 
2008). This information was corroborated by studies done by the 
Physicians for Human Rights, which identified two of the closed 
hospitals as Parirenyatwa and Harare Central Hospital. These are 
Harare’s two largest hospitals, and both had shut their doors in 
November 2008. At that time it is said that Harare Central 
Hospital had not had running water since August 2008 (PHR, 
2009). The timing for the closure of the health centers was 
untimely as this was about four months into the cholera epidemic 
and was the time when people needed health facilities the most 
(ibid). Some notable quotes in response to the health situation 
during this period include the following: 
 
Hospital wards in one of Zimbabwe’s main 
hospitals bear a resemblance to deserted, poor 
rural classrooms and the country’s empty 
supermarkets.15 
The neglect of the health sector by the government 
is genocide … To me nothing can explain this 
better, it’s genocide, simple.16 
Right now I have no anti-hypertensives, no 
antiasthmatics, no analgesics, nothing for pain … I 
have a woman in labour, I have no way of 
monitoring blood pressure … and I have no suture 
material to do a repair if she tears.17 
I have no pain medication, I have some antibiotics, 
but no nurses … If I don’t operate the child will 
die, but if I operate the child will also die.18 
 
According to National Science Foundation’s President Rita 
Colwell (2013) the cholera outbreak should never have gotten this 
far out of hand; Zimbabwe had been previously renowned for its 
fairly good health system and should have managed the outbreak 
well. But due to the economic crisis, what started off as a 
																																								 																				
14 Berger and Thornycroft (2008). 
15 Doctor representing the Zimbabwe Junior Doctor Association cited in Hungwe (2008). 
16 ibid. 
17 Nurse in a Rural Clinic in Zimbabwe cited in PHR (2009).  
18 Pediatric Surgeon in a major hospital in Zimbabwe cited in Hungwe (2008). 
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sanitation problem spiralled into an alarming extermination of 
people by a manageable disease. Food insecurity during the peak 
economic crisis also increased the incidence of tuberculosis, which 
to some extent is linked to the HIV/AIDS virus (Burke et al., 
2014). Improved TB management since the climax of the crises 
suggests that the TB epidemic at first mirrored the socioeconomic 
collapse and then the subsequent recovery of the country (ibid).   
Given the above, in 2008, Zimbabwe had a record low life 
expectancy of 34 years for women. The life expectancy for men 
was 37, and for both sexes these figures were down from 62 years 
in 1990 (PHR, 2009).  The economic situation also spiralled into a 
‘mass exodus,’ which as one newspaper article noted: A [South 
African] border official called it a human tsunami of people fleeing the 
nation.19 
Explaining the mass exodus, a government physician 
disclosed his monthly gross income in ZWD which at the time 
(November 2008) was worth USD $0.32  (PHR, 2009). Yet due to 
the inflationary situation, prices were said to be doubling every 
24.7 hours (Richardson, 2013). Inevitably, the country suffered an 
enormous brain drain (Mbeki, 2009).  
On December 4, 2008, the President declared a state of 
national emergency. But, this was only in response to the cholera 
situation. As far as all else was concerned, the country was 
considered to be running business as usual. 
 
Reflections on Failed Nationalism 
 
Fast forwarding to the present day, set within a context of 
a liquidity crunch, weak financial institutions, poor public sector 
delivery, closure of companies, a shrunken labor market, high 
unemployment rate, informalization of the economy, high decent 
work deficits, low industry productivity, and reduced foreign direct 
investments, Zimbabwe’s economy remains compromised (IMF, 
2014). Commendable economic progress has however taken place 
since 2008. For as Richardson (2013) states, “…to be fair, the country 
is better off than it was…” in 2008 (p. 2). To ameliorate the 
hyperinflation, an appointed Government of National Unity 
(GNU)20 had discontinued the local currency in 2009, introducing 
a multicurrency system which is chiefly dollarized.21  
Irrespective of the marked progress, the economy is still 
relatively fragile, as was demonstrated by a deceleration in real 
GDP growth from 10.6% in 2011 to an estimated 4.4% in 2012, 
(AEO, 2013) and  3.3% in 2013 (IMF, 2014), but with a predicted 
rise of 5.7% in 2014 (AEO, 2013). The growth was debated by 
Article IV of the IMF Consultation which showed that the 
‘economic rebound’ experienced by Zimbabwe since 2009 was 
ephemeral (IMF, 2014).  The debate was  justified by a further 
																																								 																				
19 theTrumpet (2007). 
20 Government of National Unity consisting of ruling party ZANU PF and opposition parties MDC T and MDC M. 
The GNU was dissolved after the 2013 Presidential elections. 
21 The US dollar is the official currency for government trade.  
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deceleration of real GDP growth to 1.5% in 2015 (UNECA, 
2016). In support of the downward spiral in GDP growth, 
Richardson (2013) argued that the economic growth rates seen in 
Zimbabwe after 2009 did not reflect Zimbabwe’s long-term 
economic prospects. Instead they drew attention away from the 
enduring economic problems such as the ones already mentioned. 
Now nearly seven years since the temporary restoration of 
the economy in 2009, industrial capacity has decreased from 57% 
to 34% (Pilling & England, 2016). The capacity utilization levels in 
the manufacturing sector have dropped due to a slowdown in 
business activity. In addition, consumer prices have fallen by 
between 2-4% (ibid). This means that there is a shortage of money 
(the US dollar) in circulation which has impacted consumer 
spending. As a result, supply of goods is high, demand is low, and 
in turn, consumer prices are falling.  In short, inflation has been 
replaced by deflation. Pilling and England (2016) note the 
significance of this, citing a Zimbabwean banker who stated: for 
the man on the street deflation looks good, but to an economist, 
the economy is going through stagnation and the country, 
deindustrialisation. Subsequently, as long as there is no production 
in the economy, it does not matter what currency is in use, or in 
local street language, ‘it is impossible to rig the economy.’22 
 Zimbabwe’s sick economy is also characterized by the high 
informalization of the economy. One study revealed that the 
informal sector functions as the second economy of the country 
and had escalated from 10% at independence in 1980 to 70% in 
2008 (Makochekanwa, 2012). More recently, TheEconomist 
(2015) claimed that the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency 
(ZIMSTAT) disclosed that 94.5% of the 6.3 million people 
defined as employed were working in the informal economy. 
While some critics had questioned the broad definition used of 
informality, using a stricter definition of the term only reduced the 
number down to 86%. The loss of formal employment, 
informalization also leads to unemployment - another symptom of 
the sick economy. Actual figures for unemployment are disputed 
among major organizations such as ZIMSTAT, National Social 
Security Authority (NSSA) and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade 
Union (ZCTU), with the government parastatal ZIMSTAT giving 
the lowest figures of unemployment rate of 11%. The more 
realistic, albeit speculative, figures of unemployment in Zimbabwe 
range between 94% and 80% for the 2008 to 2014 period. 
Makochekanwa (2012), maintains that the unemployment rate 
went up from 70% in 2003 to 94% at the peak of the crises in 
2008. A local newspaper however revealed an unemployment rate 
of 80% based on figures sourced from a ZCTU survey in 2014.23   
Nonetheless, aside from already noted undulant real GDP, 
the GDP per capita has also dramatically shifted from 9.2% in 
2011 to an estimated 3.1% in 2012, with a further 3% decline in 
																																								 																				
22 Figure of speech used typically by disenfranchised citizens who mockingly say that while it may be possible for the 
government to rig electoral votes, it will be impossible for it to rig the failing economy. 
23 Mtomba (2014). 
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2014 (AEO, 2013). This suggests new forms of vulnerability which 
will be extensive, possibly exceeding the usual vulnerability that is 
considered as possessing either the face of a peasant or that of a 
woman. To highlight the policy environment presiding over the 
economic crises, the situation is said to be one of “ … the 
persistence of macroeconomic instabilities combined with policy 
responses only aggravating rather than remedying economic 
problems” (Kaminski & Ng, 2013, p. 2). These two scholars 
reason that the economic crisis in Zimbabwe is a result of a 
combination of factors, a mixture of which defies economic logic. 
What is less baffling according to their argument is that the demise 
is entirely home-brewed. A vicious cycle of bad policies has played 
an instrumental role in the deterioration of the business 
environment, causing negative implications for industry growth, 
foreign direct investment, employment, and so forth. In further 
explaining the policies that lead to the crises, Munemo (2012) 
reasoned that in contexts where policy making is personalized 
rather than institutionalized, people perish at the whim of the 
personal ruler. And so to borrow from the usage of a 
Shakespearean expression by Mkandawire and Soludo (2003), the 
Zimbabwean situation, ‘is not in its unlucky stars’ but is a result of 
the many acts of omission and commission that have resulted in 
an interlocked crisis. 
 
Conclusion: Weighing in the Countervailing Effect 
of Governance in Zimbabwe 
 
In simple terms, to countervail is to offset something 
through countering it with equal force. Used in its denotative 
sense, the word countervailing thus entails the idea of ‘counter 
forces.’ In this paper, I presented three concepts within a nexus 
(risk, resilience, and sustainability) which I coupled with 
governance - a concept having equal force but an opposite effect. 
In essence, governance serves as the confounder24 countervailing 
outcomes under each of the concepts within the nexus (risk, 
resilience, and sustainability).  In the opening sections of the 
paper, I highlighted the impact that governance has toward 
increasing risk, decreasing resilience, and stalling sustainability. As 
I showed further, the significance of governance in propelling 
transformative change in the direction of inclusive and people-
centered sustainable development is supported by reports from 
the UNDP (2014), UN (2012a) and UN (2012b). However, I also 
went on to highlight some of the challenges which threaten 
governance by citing Motter (2015) who asserted three main 
points:  
																																								 																				
24 The term confounder used here is borrowed from Statistics where it is defined as a variable related to variables of 
interest that either obscures or accentuates the relation between them (see Meinert, 1986, p. 285). In this instance, 
bad governance is argued to be the variable that lessens resilience and sustainability, accentuating conditions of risk, 
while good governance is said to have the opposite (positive) effect. 
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(1) Political processes tend to be dominated by ‘particular interests’ – 
usually political, that overlook the common good ultimately foiling 
the prospects of achieving inclusive growth and equitable social 
development  
 
(2) There is an inherent tendency for politicians to sacrifice the long-
term perspective that sustainable development requires to the 
short-term pressure of the electoral cycle;  
 
(3) In many countries the often thin divide between executive and 
legislative powers remains feeble, thus politicians often snub and 
or supplant the rule of law to preserve their own interests versus 
the common good.  
 
The challenges put forward by Motter very much reflect 
the Zimbabwean situation. The retrospective analysis of the crisis 
situation in the country paints a clear picture of how governance 
issues countervail the risk, resilience, and sustainability nexus. 
Through the narrative of the crisis, we see the manifestation of 
Ribot’s25 claim that, ‘vulnerability just does not fall from the sky.’ 
Crucially, we directly see how political instability can lead to an 
economic crisis and how an economic crisis can in turn lead to 
implications on the health, education, and agriculture sectors and 
the welfare of an entire population found within the crisis region. 
In such a fragile environment, the cases of poverty feed into the 
perpetuation and escalation of natural risk, health risk, political 
risk, and economic risk – problems which overlap, impinging 
more directly on people’s adaptive capacities.  McGregor et al. 
(2011) confirm that more and more, the Zimbabwean people are 
finding themselves having to adapt to multiple stressors. In the 
desperate case of Zimbabwe, vulnerability to concurrent shocks 
has translated directly into poverty, sickness or death (Coltart, 
2008). Upon consulting other sources to see how bad the 
governance problem looks in Zimbabwe, I came across the 
indicators and rankings seen in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Zimbabwe Governance and Sustainable Development 
Indicators and Ranking  




































25 Ribot (2009). 
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Taking everything into account, all hopes of sustainability 
which in Zimbabwe is often conflated with environmental 
sustainability26 seem to be futile at present. This picture presents a 
sharp contrast to the conditions in regions where good 
governance is practiced as seen through outcomes such as 
peaceful, stable, resilient societies which are sustainable. We must 
be mindful however of the fact that sustainability is more a 
journey than a destination (Esty, 2009, p. 179), and that 
sustainability asserts the need to recognise present risk, while 
learning from past risk, concurrently planning for future risk. The 
important thing as Esty says is to know where on the path of 
sustainability you are. Thus there is still hope for Zimbabwe if the 
government commits to improving the justice delivery system and 
rule of law; mechanisms for peace-building and for the prevention, 
management, and resolution of conflict; accountability in the 
management of public resources and service delivery; and people’s 




26 Refer to the pillars of sustainability in Figure 1. The three pillars of sustainability suggest that for sustainability to 
be possible, the pillars must be given equal consideration; the three pillars being - social sustainability, environmental 
sustainability, and economic sustainability. In the case of Zimbabwe, the country boasts of being a low carbon 
emitter or a net carbon sink yet, the country trails behind in other environmental indicators, let alone social and 
economic ones. 
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